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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
HAROLD DONE, dba, 
DONE EQUIPMENT COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 














BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT 
Case No. 14623 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case was filed by Harold Done, dba, Done Equipment Company of 
Delta, County of Millard; State of Utah, who is a dealer in fa~~- equi~~ent and 
machinery, vs. Ronald L. Bushman, dba Smoot' s Corner, of Marysvale, Piute 
County, State of Utah, also a machine dealer. 
The action involves the sale of certain used tr.actor and trencher:- Vl(hich 
the plaintiff had available for sale. The plaintiff alleges that on the 16th day of 
March, 1974, the defendant called plaintiff about the purchase of.said equipment. 
On the 18th of March, defendant made a trip to De~ta and ,examined the equipment. 
On the 20th day of March, he negotiated on the telephone, the sale of ~h_e _MF202 
Everett trencher for $4,350.00 to be delivered. On the 22nd of March, 1974, 
plaintiff delivered the tractor and trencher to the defendant at Marysvale, and 
demonstrated it as desired by the defendant~ and received th~ check which had been 
made out by the defendant after the telephone conversation of March 20th; that 
sales tax was waived because the sale was to the defendant, a dealer. T_he ter-
mination of the sale came only as a result of the check being subsequently dis-
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honored or the funds stopped. 
The defendant's Answer admits the equipment was examined by the de-
fendant on the 18th day of March, 1974 and purchase was discussed on the 20th 
of March, and the equipment demonstrated on March 22nd, when it was accepte: 
and paid for. Defendant claims that was upon the false and fraudulent represent· 
ations of the plaintiff. 
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT 
The Di.strict Court rendered judgment: No cause of action against the 
plaintiff. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
For Reversal of the Judgment of the District Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff, Harold Done, dba, Done Equipment Company was at all tirn° 
a dealer in farm equipment and machinery, and was an owner of a certain FM 20; 
Everett trencher and tractor. 
That on or about March 16th, 1974, the defendant Ronald L. Bushmanphcr 
ed plaintiff from hi.s place of business at Smoot's Corner at Marysvale, Utah, as· 
ing if the trencher and tractor were fo~ sale. (TR 4, Lin~ 1 O) The defendant, 
after examining equipment at Delta on the 18th of March, called the plaintiff, 
Harold Done on the telephone on or about the 20th of March, and asked plaintiff if 
he would accept $3, 000. 00, which he had offered employee at the ti.me he examine: 
the equipment in Delta. Plaintiff advised he would not. That he would sell it for 
$4 350 00 T · t h woul: 
• • • he defendant asked if plaintiff would dcl i.ver equipment; tha e 
Hk t · l' redbY e 0 see it run. (TR 7, Lin es 8 through 15th) The equipment was de ive 
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the plaintiff and his mechanic, Eldon Shurtz to the defendant at Smoot's Corner 
at Marysvale on March 22, 1974. 
After the machinery was unloaded, defendant wanted to see it run; (TR 9, 
Lines 8 through 16). Plaintiff's version of the incident was according to his 
testimony: 
Q: Describe who did what. 
A: Eldon, my mechanic backed it off the truck, then Ron and I was 
standing off to the side, talking. Eldon and the two men run 
the machine and Mr. Bushman never got on it. I never got 
on it. We dug a trench, I would say 15 feet maybe 20, and 
then one of the men took the front-end dozer and filled two 
trenches in and Ron asked me if it was in good shape and I 
said, "Yes, it is in good shape."· He said, "Will it dig rocks," 
and we had just been digging rocks and gravel, and I said, 
"Sure, within limitation, if you get a rock big;ier than the 
bucket it worlt, you have to shove your clutch in and get that 
rock out of it." All machines have a limitation; it has a lim-
itation too, it can only take a certain size rock through the 
bucket. (TR 9 Lines 15 through 30) 
Q: Now when you say you have got parts, from where? 
A: "rhere is a place in California and one in Illinois. I don't have 
the addresses but my wife has the information or the telephone 
numbers and we got parts there." And he says, "Fine, Come 
up and I will give you a check. " And then the other men drove 
it, (the trencher) back around the front of the building. (TR 10, 
Lin es 5 through 9) 
A Bill of Sale, Exhibit No. One, dated March 22, 1974 was delivered· 
to defendant, which provided for no sales tax because of the dealers' status of.the 
defendant. (TR 1 o, Line 22) The defendant delivered to the plaintiff, a check 
drawn on the account of Smoot's Corner at the Valley Central Bank, Richfield, 
Utah. 
Exhibit No. Two, a check, which is dated '3-20-74', which is a date foll-
owin;i the telephone conversation and two days previous to the delivery of the equip-
ment, (TR 11, Line 2) was given by defendant' to the plaintiff Following the 
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demonstration on March 22, 197 4. 
On the following dav, Saturday the 23rd of March, plaintiff's bookkeeper 
I 
Ruth Done mailed the check for deposit. (TR 37, Lines 28 through Page 38, 
Line 1 ) Subsequently and on the 23rd of March, 197 4, defendant telephoned the 
plaintiff relative to the addresses of the parts houses and the plaintiff referred 
him to the bookkeeper. The bookkeeper, Ruth Done testified that on the 23rd of 
March, 1974, she had a telephone conversation with Ronald L. Bushman, who 
wanted the name of the company or the telephone number where he could get part 
The. conversation according to the plaintiff was as follows: 
Q: And do you remember what you said to him and what he said 
to you on that occasion? 
_A: I just told him, "Wait a minute and I will go get the paper that 
had the information on it. It was Peoria, Illinois and Costa 
Mesa, California. 
Q: And what had been your e~perience so far as Uuse companies were 
concerned, what had been your relationship with them on parts 
and equipment? 
A: We had ordered some chainlinks and a little digger, I don't 
.know what you call them, knives from those when we came 
in off the job from Gyser Ranch when we repaired it, got jt 
back,, but as far as the bearings, I think we got those out of 
Salt Lake, which we get chainlinks there as well. 
Q: Had you had any problem at that time getting any equipment 
or parts for the equipment that you had requested at any 
. time? 
A: We hadn't needed anything other than the little digger knives 
and the chainli.nks which are wear i terns. 
Q: So, as far as you know, are you sti. ll able to get them? 
A: Still able to get those, they are universal type parts. Any 
bearing supply house in Salt Lake, I think, can get you the 
chainlinks, belt, as well as the chainlinJf.s and the bearings. 
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Q: Did you have any other discussion or conversation with 
Mr. Bushman relative to what parts were or were not 
available? 
A: No. I just gave him the number where we obtained these parts. 
(TR 39, Lines 14 through 23 ) 
The address of the parts house as read to the defendant from catalog sup-
plement was and is: Little Giant Products Inc., 1600 Northeast Adams Street, 
Peoria, Illinois, 61601, Telephone: 309-673-9091. 
On cross-examination defendant asked Mrs. Done if there was a discussion 
in which she was requested not to deposit the check, and she answered: "No Sir, 
there wasn't." (TR 40, Line 21 ) 
The action of the defendant was louder and more convincing than is even 
the statements of the defendant, such actions are: 
A. Defendant wanted to see the ·equipment and make his appraisal of its 
suitabil Hy for his purposes. He drove to Del ta and found the plaintiff's employee 
and made such personal inspection as he cared to. and offered the plaintiff's 
employee $3, 000. 00 purchase price. ( TR 44, Line 11 ) 
B. Defendant telephoned the plaintiff on March 20, advising that he had 
seen the equipment and negotiated with the plaintiff for its delivery for.the sum of 
I 
$4,350.00, which excluded sales tax. (TR 46, Lines 20 through 22) · 
C. When equipment was delivered on March 22, 1974, plaintiff's mechanic 
showed the defendant's operator how to operate the gears and dig a trench. The 
defendant's operator filled in a 22 foot trench and the defendant expressed satis-
faction and delivered to the plaintiff, the check for $4,350.00, Defendant has made 
several references in his testimony that the trencher was going to be used in 
Marysvale, Utah, apparently with the inference that the plaintiff was guaranteeing 
a specific performance which is contrary to the testimony. The defendant, in his 
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testimony stated that the demonstration made of the equipment on March 22, 1974 
at defendant's place of business was " •• rather an easy demonstration." (TR 48 
' 
Line 10) But it is important to note that the plaintiff complied with every request 
made by the defendant at the time that it was delivered and that there was not and 
could not be an express warranty on used equipment sold on inspection. Both were 
dealers of machinery and equipment and both knew that all machinery has limit-
ations with regards to performance. The defendant's allegations of express war-
ranty and/or fraud are no stronger than his own testimony as determined on cross· 
examination. (TR 71 , Line 10) 
Q: You wanted to see it operate when you talked to him on or 
about the 20th of March, is that right? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And so he brought it over for you to see it operate, is that. 
correct? 
A: Yes, he brought it over. He had assured me that the 
machine would do what it would do. 
Q: But did he bring it over and show you like he said he would? 
A: _Yes, he did. 
Q: And did you have your 'equipment operator there? 
A: Yes, I did. 
Q: And did you see it operate? 
A: Yes, I did. 
Q: And did your equipment operator operate it? 
A: No, th~y qid not. 
Q: Did they have an opportunity--
A: The trencher part? 
Q: Any part. 
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A: Yes, one of my equipment operators did use the backfill blade on 
the front of the machine to push the trench back in. 
Q: D}d they deny you any use of the machine that you wanted to make 
of' it wi.th your operators? 
!'>( No, they di.d not, the machine itself did, however. 
Q: So you were given a free use of the equipment? 
Comment by the Court. 
Q: Di.d he permit you the full use and demonstration that you 
wanted of the equipment? 
Q: Did MR. Done? 
A: Yes. 
Q: All right. And when he got over there did you tell him that 
you were satisfied and that there was a check up at the station 
for t-)im? 
A: Yes, I di.d. 
· Q: .And is this the check that had been made out on March 20th, 
the date that you had talked to hi.m on the telephone? 
A: Yes I did. 
l't '• -
Defendant· further testified on cross-examination as to a conversation he 
had with K.ichard G. Spurlin who was an associate with Dixon Corporation, re-
lati.ve to repair parts. Mr. Spurlin had be~n referred to him by the Little Giant 
Products Company of Peoria, Illinois, whom the Done Equipment Company book-
keeper had advised defendant that they had received parts from. The following ' 
i.s the testimony of a conversation that the defendant Ronald Bushman had regard-
ing parts: (TR 75, L i.ne 15 through 30 ) 
Q: Have you ever had correspondence with Richard Spurlin? 
A: Yes. I talked to.Mr. Spurlin Fri.day on the telephone. 
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Q: And did you ask him relative to replacements, chains,' 
sprockets, bearings, conveyor belting, hydraulic motor, 
pump cylinder, repair bushings and shafts? 
A: Yes sir, I did. 
Q: And did he tell you that those are the main items we try to 
· have made up and on hand? 
A: Yes sir, they do that now. 
Q: Then these parts are available, are they not? 
A: They are now, sir, yes. 
Q: Well, if they are now they would be then, if you ·had made the 
proper inquiry, would they not? 
A: I talked to the same man then, they were not then available sir. 
Q: Is that Mr. Done's fault if the parts man was temporarily 
out of something that you wanted, is that Mr. Done's fault? 
A: Dixon Corporation had just taken over the line, sir. Little 
Giant Products had gone out of business and Dixon Corpor-
ation had just taken over the line. 
Q: It is not your contention, is it, that Mr. Done made any fraud-
ulent statement to you; he told you that he had been able to ob-
tain parts. Parts are still obtainable. The equipment can 
still be operated by these items which you have described as 
wanting when you caused the equipment to break, isn't that a 
fact? ·' ' '· ',' ,. 
THE COURT: Is this a question? 
Q: Let me rephrase that. pushings can be obtained, can they 
not? 
A: Some of them, yes sir. 
Q~· ~earings can be obtained? 
A: Yes sir. 
Q: Shafts can be obtained? 
A: Yes sir. 
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Q: Sprockets can be obtained? 
A: Yes sir. 
Q: Conveyor, belting? 
A: Yes sir. 
Q: What else do you need? 
A: We need a specific bushing that goes inside the slip clutch 
which Dixon Corporation has not been able to obtain. 
(TR 75, Line l!3 through 30, page 76 1 Line l through 30 
page 77, Line l through 3 ) ' 
It is submitted that by any reasonable effort, defendant could have obtained 
repair parts or have had them made by ,a precision machine shop.' The testimony 
of the defendant does confirm that the plaintiff Harold Done did not make any false 
or fraudulent representation, either as to where he obtained parts or as to his use 
and the condition he krnw pf the equipll\ent. 
The defendant Ronald Bushman made no reasonable effort.to operate· the 
equipment or to mitigate any damages. He was a dealer, yet after the bucket had 
' ' been sprung he merely took some pictures, to show that some gears or bearings or 
some other part of the equipment had been worn. He tQok a picture marked Exhibit 
No. 61 by which he atte'mpts to e~tablish the removal of a slip c'lutch but when asked 
on cross-examination, about Exhibit No. 6, makes the following reply: (TR 78, 






Now, what are ~ome of the reasons or purposes that this piece 
of equipment or part here~ ( indicq ting ) couldn't be replaced 
with a larger bearing? 
Could be, yes. 
Not necessarily the removal of any slip clutch or so forth? 
Well, not necessarily. 
So this Exhibit No. 6 1 where you have pointed to some cutting 
in the framework here, (indicating), is not necessarily indi-
cative of removing a slip clutch, is it? 
MR. OLSEN: We will object to this line of t~st!fying and that it isn't" 
material, isn't getting us anyplace. 
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COURT: Well, you went into the slip clutch and whether or not it 
had been removed, it is cross-examination, overruled, Do you 
understand the question? Restate the question. 
Q: 
A: 
This cutting could have been for several reasons, to replace 
this sprocket or gear (indicating ) could it not? 
Could have been. 
Q: To place a larger one there? 
A: Yes •. 





Now, is it not pos~ible that in this area (indicating) there are, 
and I point out here (indicating), that there are shearer bolts 
which would have been in lieu of a slip clutch? 
Yes sir. 
And shear bolts right here (indicating) would have served the 
same purposes as a slip clutch, would they not? 
A: : No sir, they would not. 
Q: But they would have stopped the equipment if there had been 
shear bolts here, (indicating), it would serve the same pur-
- pose that_ a slip clutch would, is that correct? · 
A: .If there had been, yes. 
(TR 78, Lines 23 through 30, page 79, page 80, Lines l and 2) 
-
Neither defendant or plaintiff knew whether equipment had slip _clutch or shear 
pins'--nor was it discussed by them. The facts are that the defendant, damaged the 
' -bucket while he was lettin:;J the equipment self-operate 1 then permitted the trencher 
and tractor to remain on his premises, doin;J nothing to repair it or to mitigate loss 
or damage until December 5, 1974, eight mont!1s later, when h'? cleli Jared the equip-
.mc:i.r_bacl< to the plaiTt,iffin a gestur2 of ::;.m.::hiding his r.:ispon.;ibility and without 
any con!;ent for redelivery by the plaintiff1 placing the plaintiff at a financial dis-
. ' 
advantage. The only notice of terminating the agreement was return of the check·1 
(Exhibit No. 2) rnarl<ed insufficient funds on or ~bo~t March 26th, and the return 
of the Sales Tax Waiver April S, 1976. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE: The Court erred in making the following Findings of Fact and Conclus-
ions of Law, which findings are not supported by the evidence: 
1. Finding number one, the "Everett trencher was sold for the defend-
ant's use at Marysvale, Piute County area." 
2. Finding number two, that the trencher was in good condition and 
parts and materials for the machine were readily available. ' 
3. Finding number three, that the machine was suitable for use in the 
1V1arysvale area and could work in rocky ground. 
I-A There was no clear and convincing evidence of fraud. 
The defendant in his Answer in paragraph "C" and "D" asks for termination of 
the contract on the grounds of fraud and misrepresentation. (File s3) But there is 
great variance in his pleading and his proof. 
The defense of fraud and misrepresentation is an affirmative defense and in 
order to have a sale voided for fraud, the defendant has the burden of establishing by 
clear and convincing proof and not by suspicion or innuendo, (Lundstrom vs. Radio 
Corporation of America, 17 Utah 2d 114, 405 P 2d 339) that the seller had a precon-
ceived intention to practice deception upon the buyer. 
The Supreme Court has in numerous cases, including Pace vs. Parish, 122 
Utah 141; 247 P 2d 273; and in Fleming vs. Fleming Felt Company, 7 Utah 2d 293; 
323 P 2d 712, has stated that the essential elements of fraud include a knowing false 
representation made by the seller of a presently existing material fact, upon which 
the buyer relied to his peril. That the buyer did, infact, not rely on independant 
inspection or inquiry. That the buyer did, infact, exercise reasonable care and 
prudence before entering into the transaction. (Schow vs. Guardstone, Inc., 18 
Utah 2d 135; 417 2d 643) 
The defendant: a dealer in equipment, first on March 16, 1974, asked to 
see and "'"z·mir,e the equipment. (TR 6, Line 9 and 10) He next did examine it on 
plaintiff's yard on Iviarch 18, 1974. (TR 44, Line 12 through 15 ) He made an offer 
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to buy the tractor and trencher in a telephone call initlated by him on tv1arch 20th, 
1974. (TR 45, Lines 7 through 30 ), and he wanted the equipment delivered to 
Marysvale and wanted to see it run. (TR 46, Line 20) 
The equipment was delivered to tv1arysvale on tviarch 22, 1974. He did see 
lt run. He also had two operators present who participated in operating the equip-
ment. The plaintiff did not deny him any use, demonstration or inspection he 
wanted to maKe. (TR 72, Line 14) He told plaintiff he was satisfied, to come and 
get hls check. (TR 72, Line l through 15) The defendant had every reasonable 
opportunity to inquire about the equipment from tv1arch 16th through tv1arch 22nd. 
There was no high pressure or perf:uasive or agressive sales pitch used on the de· 
fendant nor could there have been. He knew what he wanted and how to obtain it. 
He, intact, made every approach. And if the court should set aside this sale be-
cause the defendant subsequently thought he had made a bad bargain, few dealers 
could sell used equipment. 
The Supreme Court has said that the mere fact that the party may have made 
a bad bargain will not support a charge of fraud. (Schow vs. Guardstone, Ibid) 
Quoting from 37 Arn Jur Zd, Section 237 1 where a party to whom represent-
ations are made is put •1pon inquiry by his knowledge of the facts and undertakes 
to make an investigation of his own, and the other party does nothing to prevent 
this investigation from being as full as the investigator chooses to make it, and 
in the transaction the trne facts are equally open to both upon investigation, the 
investigator will not usually be heard to say that he had the right to rely on such 
representations. The doctrine of caveat emptor is recognized and applied where 
there is investigation or inspection by a purchaser. 
1-B There is insufficient preponderance of evidence from which the Co_!:!!:t 
could find warranty. 
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B: The pleadings and the evidence were insufficient to Justify a finding 
of express or implied warranty. 
' Even though the defendant did not plead a specific breach of warranty in 
his Answer, or set it up as an allegation of defense, his testimony alluded to breach 
of an express or i mplir3 l warranty as a defonse along with his ciai:n of fra·1 j .1 -,d 
rnisre pre se nta ti on and objection is raised to the variance between the allegations 
and the proof, but breac.h of warranty didnot exist in the instant case. The law 
respecting express and impl~ed warranties has been modified by the provisions of 
the Uniform Sales Act and more especially by the Uniform Corrunercial Code. And 
the Code at 70 A-2-316 provides: 
' 
"When the buyer before entering into a contract, has examined 
the goods or the' sample or model as fully as he desires, or has 
refused to examine the goods, there is no implied warranty with 
regard to defects which an examination ought, in the circumstances, 
to have revealed to him." 
Defendant examined the equipment as fully as he desired (TR 72, Line 14) 
and told plaintiff to_ come and get the check.' (J;R 73,, Line l through lS) On the 
nearest thing to a warranty the plaintiff described to the defendant orally, uses 
' 
' that he had made of the equipment, reporting it to b.e in good working condition. 
The defendant determined that it was in working condition and even if there had been 
no inspection or examination, there we~e no expres~ warranties made by the plaintiff 
on this second hand equipment upon which the defendant relied at his peril. 
In a similar case of Tibbetts & Pleasant v. Fairfax, 145, 
Oklahoma 2 ll, 2 92, P 9, it was held that the principle that 
there is no implied warranty in the purchase of second hand machinery 
was applicable in the case under consideration, wherein it appear-
ed that a highway contractor purchased a second hand road-oiler 
wagon from a municipality after its representative had seen and 
inspected the machine, the court observing that it appeared from 
the nature of the purchaser's business that he would have a better 
Judgment than the municipality as to the performance of the 
machine in the work for which it was p,urchased. 
Where a second hand aeroplane was purchased by an expert on 
aeroplane motors, and it appeared that before making the purchase 
he knew that it was a second hand machine used as a demonstrator, 
flncl toat he insµec1c.d and flew the plan5J. It was held in Aeronaut-
ca1 Corporation 01 America v. Gossett ( 1938; Tex Civ App) 117 SW 
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(Zd) 893, that the purchaser could not avoid payment of the note 
forming a portion of the purchase price upon the ground of a breach 
of an implied warranty, the court saying: "Where an expert, buying 
a second hand article, tests the article and relies on his own know-
ledge, he deals with equal opportunity with the salesman, and there 
is no implied warranty. A warranty may be implied only where the 
buyer has no opportunity to inspect the article before accr~pt[nJ' it." 
And it was hcild Ln 11.'ua-rican Soda Fountain Company v. Palace 
Drug Store (1922; Texas Civ App) 245 SW 1032, that there was no 
implied warranty in the sale of a used soda fountain where there was 
no misrepresentation and no concealment of any facts known to the 
seller, the seller was not the manufacturer thereof, and the l::luyer 
knew that he was buying a second hand fountain, and that the fountain 
delivered was of the kind and description sold, the court saying that 
the case under consideration was subject to the general rule that there 
is no implied warranty in the sale of second hand goods. The court 
·took. this view, notwithstanding the fact that the buyer didnot inspect 
the fountain before it was accepted, it appearing, however, that he 
accepted and used it and merely complained that the syrup cups were 
out of order by reason of certain screws being worn, and that the ice 
cream cabiqet leaked. It is pointed out that it was not shown that the 
buyer ever lost a sale by reason of these minor defects, which could 
have been repaired in ,a short time and at a small cost. (Compare 
'Buffalo Pitts Co. v. Alderdice (1915); Tex Civ App) 177 SW 1044 infra, 
lI c 6.) 
, There is no implied warranty of the condition of a second hand 
automobile. l\!1oore v. Switzer, 78 Colo 63, 239 P 874; Williams v. 
McClain (1937) 180 Miss 6, 176 So 717. 151 ALR 448. 
, And it was said in Henry v. Kennard (1936) 178 Okla s68, 62P 
(2d) 1184, that the doctrine of caveat emptor applies in the sale of a 
second hand automobile, and there is no 'implied warranty of quality or 
fitness. 
Another case Where the facts are very similar is Morely v. Consolidated 
Manufacturing Company, 81 NE 993, where plaintiff purchased an 
automobile which he was informed had been used as a demonstrating 
car, and the amount paid therefor was about one half the price for a 
new one of the same make. There was no implied warranty as to the 
length Qf tirqe the crankshaft in the automobile would last when sold 
by the company, which dealt in the sale of automobiles, the court say-
ing: "The subject of sale was an automobile. Even if it be assumed 
that the plaintiff had, the right to think the sale was made by the manu-
facturer, still the machine was not made especially for the plaintiff, 
but on the contrary, was which had been considerably used and knew 
was a sum below the usual price. If it be sal:d that he had the right to 
suppose it was fit to run, the answer is that it was fit to run. Every 
part essential to the running of the machine was there at the time of 
the purchase. In other words, the machine was an automobile in running 
order, and after the purchase was actually used by the plaintiff nearly 
if not quite two months before the shaft broke. If the shaft had been 
stronger it might have lasted for a longer time. Under these circumsta.nces 
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we think thiJt _there was no implied warranty as to the length of time the 
shaft would lc-i;;t,. but as to that, the doctrine of caveat empto i 11 
cable::." 67 Am Jur 2d; Section 433, page 595 r s app -
POINT TWO: Dcfenc .:int is es topped by inaction and latches. 
It was lviarcli 16, 1974 when defendant inquired about purchasing equipment. 
It was March 18, 1974 when defendant made a trip from Marysvale to Delta 
to examine the equipment. I 
On March 18th he made an offer to plaintiff and his employee of $3,000.00 
to purchase the tractor and trencher. 
On March 20, 1974 in a telephone conversation to the plaintiff he agreed to 
pay $4,350.00 for the equipment if delivered and demonstrated. 
On March 22, 1974 the tractor and trencher were delivered and demonstrated. 
And on the same date delivered the check for the purchase price. 
Plaintiff sent the check to the bank on March 23, 1974. On the 26th it was 
returned dishonored. Defendant drew his money out of the bank rather than settle 
his differences with plaintiff. 
Defendant called plaintiff's wife in June, 1974, and advised her that he would 
return the equipment. She told him those arrangements would need be made with the 
plaintiff. Defendant re turned the tractor and trencher without arrangement on December 
5, 1974, and should be es topped from damaging plaintiff by his vacillating. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Defendant admits the purchase of the equipment at the price represented. He 
has the affirmative burden of establishing a defense by a preponderance of clear and 
convincing evidence. In this he failed and the lower Court should be reversed. 
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